The Trouble With Philip Arrhidaeus

di Elizabeth D. Carney

The Ancient History Bulletin, 15/1-2 (2001), pp. 63-89

Historians have ignored Philip Arrhidaeus,¹ the half-brother and successor (323-317 BC) of Alexander the Great, because his mental disability led the Macedonian elite to consider him incapable of independent rule. Ancient and modern prejudice about mental disability has led to an over-simplified interpretation of Arrhidaeus’ role in the political history of the late fourth century BC) Two factors, in particular, have contributed to this circumstance: a tendency to understand mental limitations as absolute rather than relative or partial and an inclination to assume that the mentally disabled have no personality or character. Ironically, precisely because his intelligence was limited, Philip Arrhidaeus was sometimes a force with whom his various guardians and his wife had to reckon. Indeed, as king, he need have had only very modest mental ability to wreak considerable havoc.

A more nuanced picture of Arrhidaeus’ capacities suggests that certain events during his reign could be re-interpreted. Because he usually functioned as a puppet in the hands of some member or members of the elite, we have forgotten that he was an individual who could and sometimes did assert his own will. In addition, a better understanding of his career implies that we need to re-evaluate our assessment of the nature of Macedonian kingship.

Once I have established what our sources tell us about his career, I shall consider what this evidence tells us directly and indirectly about Arrhidaeus’ ability to function. Next I shall assess how well Arrhidaeus’ mental capacities match the characteristics of those today considered to have mental retardation. Then I shall reflect on what his career suggests about Macedonian kingship and about personal kingship in general and I shall conclude with a reassessment of his role in events after the death of Alexander.

My examination of these issues is inevitably limited by the quality of our sources. Not only are sources for the period after Alexander’s death scanty and spotty, but they are also affected to a degree difficult for us to assess by the propaganda wars of the Successors. The severity of Arrhidaeus’ disabilities may have been exaggerated by his enemies whereas his supporters may have painted an overly rosy image of his abilities. Worse yet, it is certainly possible that some of our much later and derivative extant sources preserve both traditions, unwittingly generating a highly contradictory portrait of this little-known ruler.² On the other hand, it is equally possible that his skills and abilities actually were uneven and variable. Granted these difficulties with the sources, I have tried to base my conclusions on the preponderance of the evidence, rather than depending heavily on any one source.

The Career of Philip Arrhidaeus

Arrhidaeus was a son of Philip II by Philinna (Satyr. ap. Athen. 13.557d), one of the lesser-known of Philip’s seven wives. Arrhidaeus was close in age to his famous half-brother, although whether he was slightly younger or older than Alexander is uncertain.³ Whatever the relative ages of the two half-brothers, Philip singled out Alexander, not Arrhidaeus, for public distinction, suggesting that Philip expected Alexander to succeed him. Shortly after Philip had achieved domination of the Greek peninsula in 338, during the period in which he was planning the invasion of the Persian Empire, an incident (Plut. Alex. 9.4-5; Satyr. ap. Athen. 13.557d-e; Just. 9.7.3-7) occurred that indicated that Alexander’s position as his father’s presumptive heir was no longer secure. Attalus, the guardian of Philip’s latest bride, proposed a toast at the wedding festivities that seemed to reject Alexander’s legitimacy as heir; when Alexander objected, Philip supported Attalus rather than his own son or, at the very least, did nothing to defend him. After this public quarrel, Alexander and his mother went into self-imposed exile. A reconciliation between father and son followed (Plut. Alex. 9.6, Mor. 70b-c, 179c), but another quarrel, relating to a proposed Macedonian-Carian marriage alliance, soon happened, demonstrating that the reconciliation was hollow.⁴

Plutarch (Alex. 10.1-3) alone reports⁵ that Alexander was so worried by the news that his father planned to marry Arrhidaeus to the daughter of Pixodarus, the satrap of Caria, that Alexander attempted to substitute himself as prospective groom; Philip’s dealings with Pixodarus were part of his effort to establish a base in Asia prior to the arrival of the main expeditionary force in Asia. The result of Alexander’s intervention in the marriage alliance was a disaster: Pixodarus chose no royal Macedonian son-in-law and an enraged Philip sent a number of Alexander’s friends into exile.

According to Plutarch (Alex. 10.1), Alexander’s response to the projected marriage meant that he considered his brother a possible threat to his own accession and read his father’s dealings with Pixodarus as a sign that he himself had been supplanted as probable heir.⁶ The context of the projected Carian marriage alliance makes Alexander’s response understandable. Between his great victory in 338 and his expected departure for Asia, Philip arranged or attempted to arrange four royal marriages (a new one for himself and ones for all his other children of marriageable age),⁷ but none for Alexander. So far as we know, Philip had paid no public attention to Arrhidaeus before, but now he planned for him a marriage that Alexander’s intimates considered brilliant and politically significant (Plut. Alex. 10.1).⁸ Although Plutarch’s narrative has Philip, while scolding his son, refer disparagingly to Pixodarus and imply that he had preferred his half-brother as bridegroom because the marriage was unimportant, Philip’s severe punishment of Alexander’s supporters in this intrigue suggests that the marriage alliance was actually quite important,⁹ especially because of the critical need for support in Asia.¹⁰ Moreover, if Philip really still saw Alexander as his primary heir, his failure to arrange any marriage for Alexander before his expected departure on the Asian campaign seems curious. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising Alexander considered the marriage alliance threatening.

Apart from what it may say about Alexander, the incident implies several things about his half-brother Arrhidaeus’ ability to function: he was now of marriageable age and not understood to be incapable of marriage and procreation;¹¹ Pixodarus, though he preferred Alexander when given that option, did not deem Arrhidaeus an inappropriate bridegroom and Alexander found it plausible that Philip seemed to include him in the succession.¹² If Philip really intended to displace Alexander from the succession as Alexander feared, he could have seen Arrhidaeus as a plausible royal placeholder, able to rule at least in name until either a son of his own or a younger son of Philip’s by Cleopatra could take the throne. In short, Philip may have envisioned (or Alexander at least feared that he did) a role for Arrhidaeus not unlike that some may have expected him to play after Alexander’s death (see below). Even if we concede that an insecure Alexander somewhat over-read the significance of Philip’s plans for Arrhidaeus, one must conclude that his father, the court, and foreign powers treated Arrhidaeus as a functional part of the Argead dynasty.

We know little about what Arrhidaeus did or where he was during the years of Alexander’s reign. It is telling that Alexander did not bother to kill him, although he did eliminate other males who might have had a claim on the succession, as well as a number of other people who displeased him. With Philip dead, Alexander apparently did not consider Arrhidaeus a threat.¹³ Arrhidaeus was in Babylon at the time of Alexander’s own death in 323. He may have spent most of his brother’s reign still in Macedonia, under the observation of Alexander’s general Antipater,¹⁴ but it is more likely that Arrhidaeus accompanied his brother on campaign. Not a trusting man, Alexander was unlikely to leave far behind a member of the royal dynasty so obviously ripe for exploitation by others. Even if Alexander’s dealings with Antipater took a number of years to become as troubled and tense as they were in the last years of the king’s reign, the king would have wanted to keep a close personal eye on his easily manipulated brother. In Alexander’s camp, Arrhidaeus appeared as a participant with his royal brother in sacrifices and ceremonies (Curt. 10.7.2). We do not know whether these rituals were public, whether they were connected with dynastic ritual or that connected to the army or even, possibly, local Babylonian rites.¹⁵

The period after Alexander’s sudden death was a chaotic one since he had no obvious successor. Violence broke out within days of his death when the Macedonian elite (most of the officer corps and the aristocratic cavalry), led by Perdiccas, favored a regency for a possible posthumous son of Alexander’s to be born to Alexander’s first wife, Roxane (the son, Alexander IV, was indeed born a month or two after his father’s death) and the Macedonian infantry, led by Meleager, preferred Arrhidaeus as king. In the end an unworkable compromise was effected. There would be two kings, Arrhidaeus (now re-named Philip) and the infant Alexander IV, and Perdiccas would be regent.¹⁶ This confusing period is poorly attested. All surviving accounts of events in Babylon were written centuries later and most are either brief or fragmentary (Just. 13.1.1 — 4.4; Diod. 18.2.1- 4; Curt. 10.7.3 — 10.20; Arr. FGrH 156 F 1.1; Heidelberg Epitome FGrH 155 F 1.1-2). Curtius, a Roman historian probably writing in the first century AD,¹⁷ offers the only truly detailed account of the tumultuous period immediately after Alexander’s death.

Curtius’ treatment of Arrhidaeus’ role in these events differs from that of other extant sources in two respects: he never says that Arrhidaeus had a mental disability¹⁸ and, whereas the other sources describe Arrhidaeus as a mere tool in the hands of first, Meleager and later Perdiccas, Curtius’ narrative depicts Arrhidaeus as an occasional actor in events, as a diplomatic, if unaggressive, figure.¹⁹ Curtius’ Arrhidaeus, although at first the cat's paw of Meleager (an infantry officer who galvanized the infantry in support of Arrhidaeus and against Perdiccas²⁰), gradually became more. According to Curtius, Arrhidaeus himself put on his brother’s royal garments (10.7.13)²¹ and tried to effect a reconciliation between infantry and cavalry (10.8.20-22). He seemed determined to keep the troops peaceful (10.8.6) and to avoid civil strife, even offering to give up his new position if such a sacrifice would prevent civil war (10.8.16-20). Curtius says that Arrhidaeus actually gave a brief speech in public (10.8.16-19). Curtius also recounts that Arrhidaeus participated in a purification ritual involving the army (10.9.11-19). Demonstrating some basic skill at self-preservation, Arrhidaeus did the best he could to, on the one hand, avoid complicity in Meleager’s attempted murder of Perdiccas (10.8.2, 6), and, on the other, in Perdiccas’ elimination of Meleager and his supporters (10.9.19).²² The picture created is one of a weak and frightened man scrambling to survive and willing to almost anything to do so.

Arrhidaeus emerges from Curtius’ narrative as considerably less than a heroic (he is consistently passive, unwilling to risk himself for either of his self-proclaimed protectors) or even decisive figure, but a man with at least a basic grasp of the realities of his own chances for survival, a man with enough sense to doubt the trustworthiness of Meleager (10.8.2) and, judging by his caution in endorsing Perdiccas’ actions, his too. The courts of Philip and Alexander were not safe places and even a man of limited intelligence who grew up in such a violent and treacherous environment may well have developed certain survival skills.²³

Curtius’ account of events at Babylon has sometimes been read as a virtual allegory for Roman events. ²⁴ Certainly Curtius sometimes explicitly refers to Roman history, as in the famous digression (10.9.1-6) placed in the middle of his narrative of events after Alexander’s death or in references to the Parthian empire. The notion, however, that Curtius’ narrative not only alludes to Roman events but is actually about them, not Macedonian matters, is implausible. Although Curtius’ entire account of Alexander’s reign was once in scholarly disfavor, most recent scholarship, tends to conclude that Curtius’ narrative, while undeniably influenced by Roman experience, also reflected his understanding of fourth century events and was the work of a reasonably accurate²⁵ and fairly sophisticated political historian, however florid and rhetorical his prose might have been (a more favorable reading of Curtius’ sources usually accompanies these views).²⁶

In 1999, McKechnie challenged this new orthodoxy about Curtius’ qualities as a historian, using the section of the narrative dealing with events after Alexander’s death as his primary evidence. He argued that Curtius’ account of events at Babylon should be rejected because his narrative was shaped by his ‘implied parallel between Alexander’s empire and the Roman empire’ and, more particularly, because of his ‘use of the þdebate on three constitutionsþ motif as an organizing principle in his version of events after Alexander’s death.’²⁷ Thus, while other scholars have doubted elements in Curtius’ narrative (e.g. the speeches) and recognized references to Roman affairs in his work but believed that Curtius’ account was useful and that rhetorical embroidery and Roman coloring were easily recognized and excluded, McKechnie has argued that these two elements are so fundamental to Curtius’ version of events that the narrative cannot be used because it is impossible to sanitize it by excluding them.

McKechnie’s arguments are interesting but generally unpersuasive.²⁸ His views seem to depend on an unfavorable comparison (implied or explicit) of Curtius’ narrative to that of other sources. Since the importance of Curtius’ narrative derives from the paucity and brevity of other extant sources,²⁹ these comparisons are less than compelling. McKechnie suggests that we should regard with suspicion any incidents mentioned by Curtius alone, yet the very length of Curtius’ narrative, let alone the limited number of sources available for comparison, makes it almost inevitable that his account would contain material not found elsewhere.³⁰ While Curtius’ narrative seems more colored by rhetoric than that of, say, Diodorus, no ancient historical writer was unaffected by a rhetorical agenda. Analysis of the meaning of political events by the means of fictional or largely fictional speeches had a history going back to Thucydides’ day. Moreover, McKechnie’s arguments seem to assume that other sources would not have been affected by their own historical context (or that of the works from which they derive)³¹ and that being so affected is, by definition, bad.³²

That Curtius saw Macedonian events through a Roman lens and that he may have organized details of his account on the basis of rhetorical concerns is, however, undeniably grounds for caution.³³ Certainly we must doubt that Arrhidaeus delivered the speech Curtius attributes to him (or that any of the other figures in Curtius’ narrative gave the speeches attributed to them), but the rest of Curtius’ account of Arrhidaeus’ actions is fairly believable.

Indeed, apart from Curtius’ avoidance of a direct reference to Curtius’ mental disability, his account of Arrhidaeus’ abilities seems both generally comparable to the picture provided by other sources (with one exception; see below)³⁴ and more critical and nuanced than has been recognized. Curtius’ Arrhidaeus may be able to speak in public and briefly inspire some hopes for his rule (10.9.16-22), but he is generally a pathetic figure and recognized as such by Curtius (e.g. 10.9.21) and by the army (10.8.8-9). Curtius unflatteringly compares the mere appearance of good order at Arrhidaeus’ court to the reality of it at Alexander’s (10.8.8-9).

Once the compromise at Babylon was effected, the two kings accompanied the army and the regent. Decrees were made in their names, buildings dedicated, decisions made.³⁵ Soon after Arrhidaeus became king, a surprising event occurred. Cynnane,³⁶ a daughter of Philip II by an Illyrian wife, escaped the control of Antipater and managed to get to the Macedonian army in Asia, accompanied by a small military force and her teenaged daughter, Adea.³⁷ Years before, Alexander had murdered Adea’s father, his cousin, on the grounds that he had plotted to take the throne himself (Plut. Mor. 327c; Curt. 6.9.17, 10.24; Just. 12.6.14; FGrH 156 F 9.22). Cynnane’s aim was to arrange the marriage of her daughter to Philip Arrhidaeus. Perdiccas hated the idea of the marriage and had Cynnane murdered, but the slaughter of Philip’s daughter enraged the ordinary Macedonian troops and they compelled Perdiccas and the elite to allow the marriage to go forward (FGrH 156 F 23). Adea (now called Eurydice), trained to fight in battle as women in the Illyrian elite did, tried to woo the Macedonian army away from its allegiance to the various male generals (Diod. 18.39.2-4; FGrH 156 F 9.31), until old Antipater, by then regent, managed to silence her (Diod. 18.39.4; FGrH 156 F 11.42, 44). He, Adea Eurydice, and the kings returned to Greece (Diod. 18.39.7). Thus, during this period, Arrhidaeus’ young wife repeatedly tried by speech and action to influence the course of events whereas, so far as we know, Arrhidaeus did nothing.

Back in the Greek peninsula, Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV and his mother Roxane, remained with and under the control of the regent Antipater, and later, after the death of Antipater in 319, that of the new regent Polyperchon (Diod. 18.48.4). The sources, with one exception, refer to the presence of the kings with the regent and the army but say nothing of what, if anything, either king did. Plutarch (Phoc. 33.5-7) recounts an incident³⁸ long after Alexander’s death, involving competing Athenian embassies sent to Polyperchon, Arrhidaeus, and the court. A change in Macedonian policy toward the Greek city-states (having previously favored anti-democratic factions — in the case of Athens, that of Phocion — the Macedonians now preferred the democratic party in Athens) precipitated considerable political upset, charges and counter charges, with both sides competing for Macedonian support. Sitting under a golden canopy, Philip Arrhidaeus, his Companions, and Polyperchon listened to the speeches of Phocion’s party and to those of his enemies.

Plutarch says that Arrhidaeus reacted to these complex and largely verbal events in a way that means that he was paying attention to the course of this confusing public dispute and that he had some, although probably very limited, understanding of the situation. He laughed at a sarcastic remark one of Phocion’s opponents made, apparently aware that the Macedonians now favored the anti-Phocion faction.³⁹ Plutarch reports that Polyperchon publicly expressed concern that the king not believe the charges leveled at him by Hegemon, one of Phocion’s friends. It is certainly plausible that Polyperchon would have worried that Arrhidaeus would take literally the hostile statements of Polyperchon’s enemies. In fact, in contrast to the concern Polyperchon articulated, Philip Arrhidaeus, still quite loyal to Polyperchon and sensitive at least to the tone and manner of Hegemon’s remarks which he apparently took to be insulting,⁴⁰ tried to run the man through with a spear and had to be restrained by Polyperchon.

This intriguing episode confirms that Arrhidaeus’ mental limitations were not severe enough to prevent him from having some if limited comprehension of political issues. He knew whose side he favored but felt no need to restrain an extreme physical demonstration of his preference, whereas Polyperchon limited himself to verbal indications of the same preference (Phoc. 33.6-7). Indeed, the episode suggests that Arrhidaeus’ marginal competency presented more difficulties than more severe mental problems would have. Had Arrhidaeus simply continued to sit under the canopy and failed to react at all, Polyperchon would have had no trouble. As it was, the regent had to worry about the king’s opinion and, at the same time, try to control the king’s actions. Philip Arrhidaeus’ reaction to Hegemon’s tone, however, seems much odder in our world than it would have in his own; we need to place it in its appropriate context.

After all, his father Philip II tried to kill Alexander during one banquet when his son irritated him (Plut. Alex. 9.5) and, during another, Alexander, irked by the tone of remarks made by Cleitus, grabbed a spear and, though his Companions tried to restrain him, did kill Cleitus on the spot (Plut. Alex. 50 — 52.4; Arr. 4.8.1-9.9; Curt. 8.1.19-2.13; Just. 12.6.1-18). Cleitus had previously saved Alexander’s life (Arr. 1.15.8; Curt. 8.1.20; Diod. 17.20.7; Plut. Alex. 16.5). Arrhidaeus could have been present for both earlier incidents which may have made a lasting impression; a young man of limited mental ability might well have concluded such murderous behavior was appropriate when a king was angered. It is an important distinction that on the occasions referred to, Philip and Alexander were drunk, whereas Philip Arrhidaeus was, so far as we know, sober (a distinction Arrhidaeus, in any event, was not necessarily capable of making). On the other hand, the Macedonian court was often the scene of violence and what passed for acceptable behavior in the Macedonian elite did not necessarily meet Athenian standards of decorum. Literary tradition often represents Philip II as acting in an extreme, arbitrary or irresponsible fashion, even when sober (Plut. Mor. 178f-179a, d; Athen. 435b-d).⁴¹ Arrhidaeus, a man of limited understanding, reacted to a perceived insult in a way that was an exaggeration of the royal norm. He was not normal, but his behavior was not terribly far from that of other Argead rulers. Had he succeeded in killing Hegemon, one doubts that Hegemon’s kin would have found the distinction between an arbitrary act by a mentally limited king and one by a drunken king a meaningful one. Arrhidaeus’ limited mental ability produced the same lack of inhibition and judgment that heavy drinking had in his close male kin.

Fairly soon after this incident, Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice somehow escaped the control of Polyperchon. After the royal pair had returned to Macedonia,⁴² Cassander, son of Antipater, was substituted for Polyperchon as regent. Justin (14.5.1-4) says that Adea Eurydice, exploiting her husband’s condition, whose duties she was beginning to claim title to, wrote to Polyperchon (and also to Antigonus) in the name of the king, and told him to give the army to Cassander, to whom the king now transferred the administration of the kingdom. Diodorus (19.11.1) says that Adea Eurydice, taking charge of the kingdom, and hearing that Olympias was going to return, asked Cassander to give aid. Polyperchon’s loss of physical control of the royal duo and his subsequent dismissal as regent precipitated a confrontation between the military forces of Polyperchon and Olympias and those of Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus. Polyperchon, Olympias, and Aeacides, her royal Molossian kinsman, led a mixed force of Macedonian and Epirote troops against Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice in command of a Macedonian army. (Cassander was out of the country.) Both Arrhidaeus and his wife were present with the army, but she probably led it.⁴³ When the home army saw Olympias, mother of Alexander and wife of Philip, they abandoned the king and his wife and went over to Olympias without a fight. Olympias captured Philip Arrhidaeus and his court somewhat before she was able to seize Adea Eurydice and her secretary (Diod. 19.11.3); she maltreated them briefly (probably hoping to compel Philip Arrhidaeus to abdicate) and then, in somewhat different fashions, had both killed (Diod. 19.4.7; Just. 14.5.10; Ael. VH 13.36). Within months Cassander returned, defeated the forces of Olympias, had her killed, imprisoned and ultimately murdered her young grandson, Alexander IV, and gave Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice a royal burial at Aegae (Diod. 1.52.5).⁴⁴

Indirect and Direct Evidence of the Sources on Arrhidaeus’ Functionality

Let us consider first what the ancient sources tell us about Arrhidaeus’ physical and mental functionality indirectly (by describing his actions and the reactions of those around him) and then directly.⁴⁵ Arrhidaeus regularly took part in public and religious ceremony (Curt. 10.7.2, 9.11-19; Plut. Phoc. 33.5-7). No source suggests that his physical appearance was abnormal.⁴⁶ Since it is possible that those performing ritual could not display obvious physical disabilities,⁴⁷ his participation in ritual may confirm that he was physically unblemished. It is unlikely that he suffered from epilepsy.⁴⁸ That the army ritual was accomplished on horseback and that he had gotten to Babylon from Macedonia implies that he had something like the ordinary physical skills of a man of his class and culture. The Macedonian elite was famously skilled on horseback and Arrhidaeus was, apparently, at least competent in this activity. Just as he was apparently trained to ride, Arrhidaeus must, judging by the Hegemon incident, have been trained to use weapons. He may have gone into actual battle, although no source clearly says that he did.⁴⁹ Perhaps, although not of sufficient mental competence to command, he was physically capable of combat but his various regents feared risking him in battle.

However normal his physical appearance and skills, it seems clear that Philip Arrhidaeus’ mental abilities were not normal. Let us evaluate the limits of his mental capacity. Since Arrhidaeus was capable of performing ritual accurately, he must have been able to follow complicated directions and may well have had some ability to memorize detail. Curtius believed that he was capable of speaking in public, as we have seen, but two passages in Plutarch (Mor. 337e, 791e; see below for discussion) seem to deny that he could. If he did speak in public, it must have been rare. Based on the evidence of both Curtius and Plutarch, he was able to follow fairly complicated verbal exchanges, although in such simplistic terms that his reaction to exchanges could be exaggerated or inappropriate. Usually but not always he was passive and dutiful, letting the generals and/or his wife act and speak for him. Judging by the incident relating to Hegemon and the behavior Curtius describes, he had some simple (perhaps highly personalized) short term grasp of the political and military struggles of his day; he knew whose side or at least what person he was currently supposed to favor. Those who managed him had to worry that he might easily be led to change sides and needed to act to prevent their enemies from manipulating him as easily as they themselves did. He seems to have been sensitive to the royal image and to perceived slights to it,⁵⁰ perhaps because he was able to appreciate little more than the external forms of kingship.

No source suggests that Arrhidaeus’ problems ever varied after they were first noted or were anything other than chronic.⁵¹ He seems always to have had a guardian or manager. Justin (13.2.11) says explicitly that Perdiccas had rejected him as a possible king because he would never be able to have more than the name of king and that someone else would hold the real power; the Heidelberg Epitome (FGrH 155 F 1.2) makes a similar connection between Arrhidaeus’ limited mental ability and the need for some kind of regent. The reported permanent nature of his problems differs from Herodotus’ description of the deteriorating mental condition of both Cambyses and Cleomenes,⁵² rulers whose capacities have been compared to those of Arrhidaeus (see below).⁵³

Two passages in Plutarch’s Moralia (337d-e, 791e) appear to contradict the general picture of Arrhidaeus’ mental capacities created by the narratives of our other sources, including Plutarch’s own Phocion (33.5-7). The Moralia passages describe a much more severely disabled monarch than the only moderately limited ruler who was so irritated by Hegemon (Phoc. 33.5-7). Both passages apply the term kophos (mute) to Philip Arrhidaeus, in each case in the context of a non-speaking stage character.⁵⁴ These passages, therefore, specifically contradict (if one takes them literally) Curtius’ report that Philip Arrhidaeus spoke to the army (10.8.16-19) and, more generally, they picture a man who understood nothing of real rule as opposed to the ruler described in Phocion, whose understanding was very limited, but who did have some simple grasp of factional politics.

How are we to resolve this discrepancy? Plutarch is not always a dependable source. He is capable of telling the same story, with the same moral, but reversing the roles of major participants in the same anecdote.⁵⁵ The discrepancy in the portrayal of the relative skills of Philip Arrhidaeus in the three passages may derive from Plutarch’s varying rhetorical needs.⁵⁶ Both passages in the Moralia compare Arrhidaeus unfavorably to another more able ruler. The first description of Arrhidaeus’ abilities (337d-e) occurs in the context of a discussion meant to demonstrate that Alexander, rather than being dependent on good fortune, triumphed because he made use of it and Arrhidaeus is mentioned to prove that good fortune alone cannot make a man great (so also Plut. Mor. 336d). Philip Arrhidaeus is explicitly and implicitly contrasted to his brother and it is that contrast, I believe, that leads to the more extreme picture of Arrhidaeus’ limitations. Similarly, in the second passage, the contrast is between Arrhidaeus and Antigonus and Plutarch’s intent is to demonstrate that ability rather than age should be the criterion for public service.⁵⁷

There is good reason to put more trust in the picture of Arrhidaeus painted by Plutarch in his Phocion. For one thing, as I have noted, descriptions of Arrhidaeus’ actions should generally be considered more dependable than general descriptions of his condition. There is particularly good reason to trust the image of Arrhidaeus in the Phocion passage. Since Plutarch clearly intends to have his readers admire Phocion and his allies, Plutarch’s rhetoric would, if anything, have led him to inflate the relative violence of Arrhidaeus’ reaction. Indeed, one wonders if he did exaggerate the king’s displeasure, possibly with the model of Alexander’s treatment of Cleitus in mind. His account of the incident is not only unflattering to Arrhidaeus but to the Macedonian court in general: his narrative clearly constructs a contrast between the Macedonian court with its luxury, idle courtiers, easy brutality and risible ruler and the dignified and heroic Phocion and his supporters. Although it would be dangerous to take any of the three Plutarch passages literally, none seems to warrant concluding that Arrhidaeus was severely mentally limited although all of them confirm the conclusion that his mental capacities were less than normal.

With the exception of Curtius, all other ancient sources specify or at least imply that Philip Arrhidaeus had a mental disability. We can hardly ignore the diction the sources employ about Arrhidaeus’ abilities. Instead, we must examine it to decide whether any of it constitutes useful evidence. Unfortunately, the terminology the sources apply to Arrhidaeus makes it difficult to determine whether he was mentally ill or retarded. This is hardly surprising. For one thing, Greek writers comparatively rarely refer to disabilities of any kind⁵⁸ and then only in general terms.⁵⁹ When reference is made to disability, euphemism is common. Arrian (3.6.6), for example, says of Alexander’s notorious treasurer Harpalus that his body was unfit for warlike tasks, but he avoids mention of any specific disability. I know of no Greek term that clearly refers to the condition we term retardation, although there are a number of Greek terms relating to madness or insanity.⁶⁰

More significantly, Greeks may not have distinguished in any generic way between mental illness and mental retardation; ⁶¹ modern medicine did not until 1845;⁶² in popular speech and understanding, this failure to distinguish sometimes persists.⁶³ On the other hand, though the sources do not clearly indicate any recognition that Arrhidaeus suffered from a different category of mental illness than the other mentally troubled rulers, examination of diction applied to Arrhidaeus in comparison to that applied to the others does demonstrate a difference in emphasis. Whereas Herodotus’ account of two kings who became mentally ill (the Persian Cambyses and the Spartan Cleomenes) often employs wording indicating that they had difficulty in reasoning, diction similar to that applied to Philip Arrhidaeus,⁶⁴ Herodotus also uses terms about Cambyses and Cleomenes referring to violent madness,⁶⁵ expressions never applied to Philip Arrhidaeus by any author. Clearly, the mentally ill and the mentally retarded share a limited ability to make rational decisions and our sources reflect that perception. Even if the Greeks did understand all those who lacked phren (mind, sense), as so many of our sources say Arrhidaeus did, to be insane,⁶⁶ we need not imitate their failure to make a distinction that we consider meaningful. Moreover, significantly, the sources do not generally say that Philip Arrhidaeus completely lacked the ability to reason, but term him slow and say that he was limited in this area (Diod. 18.2.2; Plut. Alex. 77.5; FGrH 155 F 1.2).⁶⁷ Our sources, therefore, offer little reason to conclude that Arrhidaeus was mentally ill.⁶⁸

Arrhidaeus and Current Definitions of Mental Retardation 

In fact, the available evidence about Arrhidaeus better matches the traits of a person suffering from mental retardation than one with mental illness. This is the most recent (1992) definition of mental retardation offered by the American Association on Mental Retardation:

Mental retardation refers to substantial limitation in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self- direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.⁶⁹

Thus the current definition emphasizes functionality⁷⁰ and requires that all three aspects of the definition be present before an individual can be considered retarded. Despite the fact that all previous AAMR definitions classified those with mental retardation according to a level of severity determined primarily by IQ scores, the current standard abolishes the old method of classification in favor of one based on the level of support needed to function as completely as possible.⁷¹ Nonetheless, the old classification system has not entirely disappeared from scholarship published after 1992,⁷² partly because it is employed in federal legislation about mental retardation,⁷³ partly because it is difficult to make use of earlier research without referring to its terminology,⁷⁴ and partly, I suspect, because it is more abstract than the new system and thus easier to use when one is generalizing rather attempting to determine treatment of individuals.

It seems clear, despite the poor nature of our sources, that Arrhidaeus would today be judged to have mental retardation. Currently, ‘significantly subaverage intellectual functioning’ is determined by an IQ score of no more than 75 or, when such information is not available, the conclusion that an individual’s intellectual capabilities are below the standard of the vast majority (approximately 97 percent) of persons of comparable background.⁷⁵ Although, of course, no such specific evidence is available for Arrhidaeus, as we have seen, all the sources but Curtius say that there was something wrong with Arrhidaeus’ mental capacity and imply that it was far below that of the rest of the elite.⁷⁶ Arrhidaeus demonstrated limitations in more than the two ‘adaptive skills’ required by the definition: our examination of his career suggests limited ability in communication, social skills, self-direction, and work.⁷⁷ Although no source provides a specific age by which Arrhidaeus displayed these limitations, Plutarch (Alex. 77.5) implies that these limitations were observable no later than early adolescence and all sources demonstrate that he had significant limitations by the time he was an adult. According to the old AAMR classification system, Arrhidaeus would probably have been classified as ‘mildly’ retarded;⁷⁸ according to the new system, he might be characterized as a person who needs intermittent support in the areas of communication, social skills, self-direction and work.⁷⁹

In addition to the fact that Arrhidaeus seems to meet the general criterion for mental retardation, other specific aspects of mental retardation seem to suit what we know about Arrhidaeus. Most retarded people have a normal physical appearance and suffer from no obvious physical disability, as did Arrhidaeus. Today, many retarded people are not recognized as such until their school years.⁸⁰ Whatever the absolute truth of Plutarch’s story about Olympias’ poisoning of Arrhidaeus as a child (Plut. Alex. 77.5), it may well signify that Arrhidaeus’ retardation was not obvious until late in his childhood. A delay in recognition seems particularly likely in societies where physical activity and oral culture mattered more than written. Plutarch’s story could, on the other hand, signify that Arrhidaeus’ retardation was not pre- or perinatal,⁸¹ but the consequence of some disease (e.g. a form of meningitis⁸² or malaria⁸³) or trauma that caused brain damage.⁸⁴

Arrhidaeus’ behavior and reactions clearly resemble those of many retarded people. Their analysis of problems is often less than subtle because of difficulty in foreseeing the consequences of an action and because of limited focus and attention.⁸⁵ The Phocion incident shows Arrhidaeus reasoning but simplistically and without apparent thought to the consequences of his action. This same episode demonstrates another circumstance common among those with retardation. Because retarded people may not fully understand what is expected of them in social circumstances, they may misinterpret a situation and therefore respond inappropriately.⁸⁶ Arrhidaeus was usually the compliant tool of those in authority over him. Passivity in finding solutions, a tendency to withdraw or depend on those in authority is typical of many retarded people.⁸⁷ Faced with repeated failures, their goal is often simply to avoid failure rather than to achieve success;⁸⁸ Arrhidaeus’ dealings with Meleager and Perdiccas seem to conform to this general pattern. Because they are more vulnerable to environmental stress, retarded people often react to events in more extreme fashion,⁸⁹ experience more anxiety,⁹⁰ and greater stress.⁹¹ On at least one occasion, Arrhidaeus’ actions were extreme. Coping with the complexities of events after his brother’s death made him anxious and somewhat unpredictable in behavior.⁹²

General prejudice and uncomfortableness about the retarded persists. Scholarly references to Philip Arrhidaeus’ disability are anything but politically correctþ‘half-witted’, ‘feeble-minded’, ‘imbecile’ and ‘moron’ — are all terms that have been applied to him.⁹³ Much of this diction, however, derives from the great difference between Philip Arrhidaeus’ abilities and his status as king and from the gap between his own skills and that of the famous brother he succeeded. These contrasts tend to generate exaggeration. For instance, as we have seen, Plutarch’s allusion (Mor. 337d) to him as being like a baby swaddled in purple — obviously contradicted by Plutarch’s own testimony elsewhere (Phoc. 33.5-7) — probably has a similar origin.⁹⁴ Such strong language would probably not have been applied to a retarded carpenter or foot-soldier or even to the retarded successor of one of the more obscure Argead kings like Amyntas II.⁹⁵ In addition, propaganda and character assassination were commonplace in the period of the Successors. Insulting references to the status of Philip Arrhidaeus’ mother doubtless derive from political caricaturing of the day.⁹⁶ Similarly, the severity of Arrhidaeus’ mental disability may well have been exaggerated by his enemies and that exaggeration then preserved in our sources.⁹⁷ It is difficult, however, to deny that Arrhidaeus had some sort of mental disability.⁹⁸

We must avoid concluding that a person with limited skills has none at all. Generalizations, however valid, are not enough. On the evidence, Philip Arrhidaeus was not a piece of royal luggage toted around by various members of the Macedonian elite, but an individual sensitive to slights to his status and sometimes tricky to handle. He had to be handled; he had to be persuaded and led. The story about Phocion’s supporters makes that obvious, but a number of other moments in his career imply the same thing. Suppose, for instance, that Polyperchon had not persuaded the king not to kill Hegemon or suppose that Arrhidaeus had not been maneuvered into accepting the elimination of Meleager.

The Implications of Arrhidaeus’ Career for Macedonian Kingship

Let us consider how these findings might relate to the nature of Macedonian monarchy. Macedonian monarchy was the defining institution of the society. Kingship belonged to the royal clan. Over the centuries, the Macedonians had experienced little order and stability; kings were frequently assassinated⁹⁹ but only Argeads were kings. Choosing a king from the Argead house was about the only consistent element in the chaotic political history of Macedonia.¹⁰⁰ Political events were understood in terms of their relationship to the king. Even during the reigns of Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV, the opposing groups were defined by their support or opposition to the kings.¹⁰¹ Only under Alexander III, and then not always, did the kings begin to employ a title; until then, it was enough to give a patronymic, demonstrating that one was the son of an Argead.¹⁰² Macedonian kingship, until there were no Argeads left, was personal and the personal possession of the Argead family.¹⁰³

I have referred to the king’s ‘regents’ only for purposes of convenience. In fact, our sources use a variety of terms that may or may not reflect original Macedonian usage, to describe those responsible for the two kings.¹⁰⁴ In the past, before the death of Alexander, there had been no need for any formal or elaborate substitute kingship; Macedonia was a country too unstable to survive a long period in which the monarch could not rule personally. Typically, a close male relative of a minor held some sort of trusteeship very briefly; then usually the minor conveniently died and the person with the real power was king.¹⁰⁵ Kingship was not understood as an office held by an individual, but rather as the possession of the royal clan, one member of which currently was king. The king had no clear job description — he did as much as he was able to get away with — and, obviously, substitute kings certainly lacked such descriptions.¹⁰⁶

The dual kingship only made matters muddier. As we have seen, Arrhidaeus, unlike minor kings in other historical periods, regularly signed papers and decrees and seems to have been able to hire and fire substitute kings.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, some historians believe that Arrhidaeus was only a placeholder who would retain his title as king only until Alexander IV came of age.¹⁰⁸ The latter was very likely the preference of Perdiccas and the rest of the elite, whatever was said publicly. Indeed, subsequent events suggest that the Macedonian elite considered even Alexander IV only a convenient temporary solution to the succession crisis; one doubts that any of them really thought he would live to rule as an adult.¹⁰⁹

Mass and elite in Macedonia, however, had very different understandings of the nature of monarchy and the importance of the Argead dynasty. Historians have, without real reflection, replicated the view of the elite and discounted that of the general Macedonian population. As events after Alexander’s death demonstrate, the members of the Macedonian elite looked at kingship in pragmatic terms and were concerned about the capacities of individual monarchs. They may well have treated Arrhidaeus with contempt, at least in private.¹¹⁰ Their preference for a possible son of the Asian Roxane, granted the prejudice of even members of the Macedonian elite against Asians and Asianizing,¹¹¹ speaks volumes about their low opinion of Arrhidaeus’ capacities. Often enough, over many reigns, members of the elite assassinated kings they did not care for or aided in the replacement of one Argead by another. Even when Alexander was only a few days dead, the more distinguished of his generals may already have looked to the day when they themselves might take a royal title.

The mass of the Macedonian population, however, was more sentimental about the monarchy and the Argead dynasty, possibly because their understanding of it was more religious in nature,¹¹² and because the populace seemed more inclined to see the monarchy in general and dynasty in particular as a source of social order. Ordinary Macedonian soldiers focused on the royal family and were comparatively indifferent to the various aristocratic king-substitutes and quite loyal to the royal family, as Arrhidaeus’ accession and other incidents demonstrate.¹¹³ Whether or not the army at Babylon was already aware of Arrhidaeus’ mental limitations at the time of Alexander’s death,¹¹⁴ the generals would certainly have made them so, yet the army continued to prefer him over the choice of the aristocrats. After Alexander’s death (and to some degree during his preceding absence from Macedonia) the women of the royal clan benefited from this phenomenon because they, as part of the family, had axioma (reputation, authority) and the generals did not. To ordinary Macedonians, therefore, Philip Arrhidaeus really was their king, to them the last living son of Philip was no token and his physical presence was vital.¹¹⁵

Reassessment of Arrhidaeus’ Role in Events 323-316

Let me consider the some of the implications of what we have concluded about Arrhidaeus in terms of the events in the years after Alexander’s death. One might wonder why, if ordinary Macedonians took Philip Arrhidaeus’ Argead kingship as seriously as I have suggested, the Macedonian army in 317/16 deserted him and his wife, an Argead by birth, and went over to Olympias, not even a Macedonian, let alone an Argead. Olympias, of course, was the champion of her grandson, Alexander IV, a half Persian boy of six. In the past, Macedonians had been anything but tolerant of Persian blood. Six years earlier another Macedonian army had preferred Arrhidaeus to Olympias’ grandson, or at least, to the possibility of such a grandson. Yet the army’s choice in 317 led directly to the execution of the royal pair, a fairly predictable development, given the nature of past Macedonian history and one the army must have expected.

Diodorus (19.11.2) says that the army changed sides because of the axioma of Olympias and because they recalled the benefactions of Alexander. Justin (4.5.10) attributes the reversal in allegiance to Macedonian memory of her husband Philip, the greatness of Alexander, to the sense that the attempt of Philip Arrhidaeus and his wife to stop Olympias from entering Macedonia was a humiliation (presumably to the memory of her husband and son). Olympias had not been seen in Macedonia in many years; doubtless the reappearance of this tough old woman did stir memories of her son and husband, but this alone would not have been enough.

Several additional factors may help to explain the disappearance of allegiance to Arrhidaeus. For one thing, it is unlikely that the army that preferred Olympias to him contained significant elements of the Macedonian forces present in Babylon in 323. Part of the answer to the change in allegiance from the strong preference for Philip Arrhidaeus in 323 and the abandonment of him to his fate in 317 must lie in what had happened in the intervening years and, perhaps, what had not happened. After six years the army would have been well acquainted with Philip Arrhidaeus’ mental limitations, but then they may have been so all along, as I have suggested. What certainly had changed in six years was this: Alexander IV was no longer a foetus of unknown gender still in his mother’s womb but a boy of six, past the most dangerous period for children and infants, whereas Philip Arrhidaeus was no more mentally competent than before and he and Adea Eurydice, after six years of marriage had, so far as we know, no children. Doubtless many factors precipitated this particular peripeteia, but surely one of them was that the army opted for an existing Argead heir over a king who, quite apart from his mental limitations, had produced no sons. Curiously enough, old Olympias stood for the future of the dynasty and that, I think, is what the army chose. After all, Macedonians had been choosing between different Argeads, with generally fatal consequences for the losing candidate, for centuries.¹¹⁶

We live in a world in which power is virtually never hereditary and rarely life-long. Because of that we have failed to see the obvious. Philip Arrhidaeus really was king and no matter how many aristocratic minders he had, if he chose to decide something or to take some action, it is hard to see how his caretakers could prevent him.¹¹⁷ Mostly, he was willing to let others decide, but we have seen that was not always so and he sometimes had to be cajoled.

The realization that Philip Arrhidaeus was king and therefore hard to stop if he chose really to be king may explain some puzzling developments. I will mention two.¹¹⁸ The various generals who were currently ‘regent’ consistently kept both kings close to them, yet Arrhidaeus and his wife somehow got out from under Polyperchon’s thumb and used the opportunity to fire him. One wonders how Polyperchon let this happen;¹¹⁹ the answer could be that he could prevent neither the departure of the royal pair nor his own subsequent dismissal. If the king chose to go elsewhere, short of a public use of force that would have compromised Polyperchon’s authority by suggesting that he did not rule for the king, what could Polyperchon do? Apparently, he was willing to use force against Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice only after he had been dismissed and after Olympias was physically at his side. Arrhidaeus may also be the explanation for the timing of the confrontation of Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice with Olympias. Why would Arrhidaeus and his wife face Olympias’ forces when their latest ‘regent’ was out of the country? Arrhidaeus may have chosen the moment and Cassander proved powerless to prevent it. Even if it was not he but his wife who chose these particular moments, the fact that Arrhidaeus was actually king made it possible.

Once one recognizes that Arrhidaeus was a man of normal appearance and manner with dangerous partial competence in public matters, it is obvious that he could have been a factor in events and decisions. In our world a man with a skill level comparable to Arrhidaeus’ would tend to be allotted menial tasks, but in fourth century Macedonia, despite the probable contempt of the elite, this man and his infant nephew were kings. None of the generals dared to take the title of king until the last male Argead was safely and long dead because none of them could be king until even the least of the Argeads was gone.

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